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Analysis of individual behavior under uncertainty naturally focuses on. 
the meaning and economic consequences of two statements: 
1. one situation is riskier than another; 
3 -. one individual is more risk averse than another.’ 
M. Rothschild and J. Stiglitz [12, 133 have considered increases in risk in 
terms of a change in the distribution of a random variable which keeps 
its mean constant and represents the movement of probability density 
from the center to the tails of the distribution.2 After restating their 
analysis in Section 1, we consider an alternative definition in whit 
expectation of utility (rather than the me the random variable) is 
kept constant. Increases in risk ought to ‘ ” more risk averse indi- 
viduals more than they do less risk averse individuals. This suggests that 
appropriate definitions of increases in risk and in risk aversion ought to 
be closely linked. In Section 3 we examine the concept of increased risk 
aversion which seems paired with the concept of increased risk and obtain 
sufficient conditions for the effect of increased risk aversion on choice 
* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the NSF-NBER Conference on 
Decision Rules and Uncertainty at the University of Iowa, May 1972. The authors are 
indebted for many helpful comments received there. Financial support by the National 
Science Foundation and the Ford Foundation are gratefully acknowledged. 
1 This statement includes the possibility that the two individuals being compared 
are the same individual with different level of some parameter, suck: as wealth. 
‘2 The basic theorem in this area was proved by Hardy, Eittiewood, and Polya [5j. 
For a discussion of the earlier literature see D. Schmeidler [15], Rothschild and Stightz 
Ill-], and S. Ch. Kolm [7]. 
337 
Copyright 0 1974 by Academic Press, Inc. 
All rights of reproduction in any iorm reserved. 
642/8/3-b 
338 DIAMOND AND STIGLITZ 
to be of determinate sign. This approach follows that of K. Arrow [I] 
and J. Pratt [l l] altered to fit our setting. 
The second part of the paper applies these general results to specific 
problems, obtaining some well known results and some which are, to 
our knowledge, new. 
1. MEAN PRESERWNG INCREASE IN RISK 
1.1. Dejinition 
Consider a family of distribution functions, $‘(‘(e, r) where B is a random 
variable defined over a finite range. (Without loss of generality we let 
the range be the unit interval.)3 Consider two distributions in the family, 
F(F(B, rl) and F(B, rz). If F(I!?, r2) is derived from F(0, r,) by taking weight 
from the center of the probability distribution and shifting it to the tails, 
while keeping the mean of the distribution constant, it is natural to say 
that F(6, rz) represents a riskier situation than F(O, ri) and that the differ- 
ence between these two variables is a mean preserving increase in risk. 
Illustrated in Fig. 1 is a simple example of such an increase where the 
e 
FIGURE I 
two distributions cross only once (so it is unambiguously clear that 
F(i9, rz) has more weight in both tails). When this situation holds we 
shall say that the difference between distributions has the singZe crossing 
property and that the difference represents a simple mean preserving 
spread. 
Analytically, we can characterize such a spread by the two conditions 
1’ [F(6, r2) - F(0, rl)] de = 0 
3 F is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable with respect to 0 and I-. It is 
unnecessary to specify the range over which r is defined. When we omit the limits of 
integration, integration is done over the full range of 8. 
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There exists a 8^ such that 
The first condition assures us that the two distributions have the same 
mean,* the second, that there is a single crossing. An immediate imphca- 
tion of (I) and (2) is that the indefinite integral of the difference in the 
distributions is nonnegative 
s ’ [F(8, r2) - F(0, rd] dt’ 2 0 O<y<l c9 0 
Hf we consider another distribution F(%, r3 generated from F(6, r$) by 
a simple mean preserving spread, F(0, r3) - F(8, rl) does not, in general 
have the single crossing property, as can be seen in Fig. 2. Since F(0, rg) 
FIGURE 2 
is riskier than F(F(B, r2) and F(F(8, rJ is riskier than F(6, r& we would hke 
to say that F(6, r3) is riskier than F(B, rl)* Accordingly, (1) and (2) do not 
provide an adequate basis for a definition of “riskier.” However, 
F(F(e, VJ - F(6, rI) does satisfy conditions (1) and (3), as does the difference 
after any sequence of such steps. Rothschild and Stightz have shown, 
moreover, that if F(L), r3) - F(@, rl) satisfies conditions (1) and (3)? 
F(o, r3) can be generated from F(6, rI) as a limit of a sequence of simple 
mean preserving spreads. Thus (1) and (3) provide a natural definition of 
increased risk.5 
applying integration by parts, Eq. (1) and the obvious properties F(0, r2) = F(0, UJ = 0 
and F(l,r,) = F(l,r,) = 1. 
5 Rothschild and Stiglitz [12] have also shown that this definition of increased risk is 
equivalent to two other definitions: that all risk averters dislike increased risk, and 
that an increase in risk is the addition of noise to a random variable. 
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In the subsequent discussion, we shall compare members of the family 
of distributions which are “close” to each other. We shall then say that 
an increase in r (the “shift parameter”) represents a mean preserving 
increase in risk if 
s ’ Fv(B, r) d19 = 0 (4) 0 
and 
T(y, r) = j ’ FJf9, r) d0 > 0 OdY<l (5) 
0 
1.2. Consequences 
To consider the consequences of increased risk Rothschild and Stiglitz 
considered an expected utility maximizing individual whose utility depends 
on a random variable, 0, and a control variable, 01 6 
u = U(6, ci) (6) 
with the assumption U,, < 0. We also assume that U, > 0.7 Then, they 
related the optimal level of 01 to increases in risk. In a form which will 
be useful for later analysis we can state their results as 
THEOREM 1. Let a*(r) be the level of the control variable which maxi- 
mizes J U(f?, CX) dF(%, r). If. mcreases in r represent mean preserving increases 
in risk (i.e., satisfy (4) and (5)), then a* increases (decreases) with r if U, 
is a strictly convex (concave) function of 8, i.e., if U,,, >(<) 0.8 
6 U is assumed to be a thrice continuously differentiable function of 0 and 01. 
’ For many problems the positivity of Ue for all OL will follow naturally, as with 
investment with a random return. However, with the possibility of short sales Us may be 
positive for some 01 and negative for others depending on the position taken by the 
investor. Also Ue may not be of one sign for a given 01. 
* Proof. a*(u) is defined implicitly by the first order condition for expected utility 
maximization 
s U,(ff, a)F& r) d@ = 0 
Implicitly differentiating, we have 
da*/dr = -[j U&.d@]/[j U,,FedB] 
Since the denominator is negative da*/dr has the same sign as the numerator. Applying 
integration by parts twice (and noting that F,(O, Y) = F,(l, r) = T(0, r) = T(t, r) = 0) 
we have 
where Twas defined in (5) and by assumption is nonnegative so that dol*/dr has the same 
sign as U&O~, 0), assuming that U,e&, B) is uniformly signed for all 8. II 
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This theorem represents a complete characterization in the sense 
changes in distributions not satisfying the definition of increasing 
can lead to decreases (increases) in 01 * despite the convexity (co~cav~t~~~ 
of U, (and, obviously, in the absence of convexity (concavity) of US 
increases in risk can lead to decreases (increases) in CX*>- 
The approach of the next section will be to explore a similar analysis 
where increases in risk keep the mean of utility constant rather than 
mean of the random variable. This is an advantage since some econo 
variables can naturally be described in several ways. For exam 
could describe the consumption possibilities arising from a short term 
investment in a consof in terms of the interest rate or in terms of the 
future price of the consol. A change in riskiness of the investment which 
kept expected price constant will not keep the expected interest rate 
constant. Alternatively in an international trade setting with orie export 
good, one import good, and uncertain terms of trade, increases in the 
riskiness of trade keeping the expected import price constant (with 
export price as numeraire) do not keep the expected export price constant 
(with import price as numeraire). More generally if we have a new random 
variable 8, monotonically related to ,the original random variable, 
6  ^= #(O)), then a change in the distribution of 6 keeping its mean constant 
will generally change the mean of 4. In adoption marginal utiIity of the 
control variable as a function of 4 
r?,(e^, a) = u&!-y@, a) (7) 
ay not have the appropriate curvature to apply Theorem 1 to changes 
in the distribution of e”, even if it is well behaved relative to 8. By con- 
sidering utility as the random variable, we obtain results which do not 
depend on the formulation of the problem in terms of 0 rather than 8. 
2. MEAN UTULITY PRESERVING HNCREASE IN 
Let us denote by &u, 01, r) the distribution of U(B, CY) induced 
distribution F(B, r) when 01 is chosen; and by a*(r), the optimal level of 
the control variable. (Without loss of generality, we can normalize z; so 
that it varies over the unit interval as 6 does.) Then, we will say that 
increases in r correspond to mean utility preserving increases in risk if9 
9 The yield-compensated change in risk of a security, considered by P. Diamond and 
II&. Yaari 131 is an example of a mean utility preserving increase in risk. 
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and 
7(1, r) = @(U, (X*(r), r) dz.4 = 0 (9) 
Since we assumed U, > 0, it is easy to relate the two definitions of 
increased riskiness. For any levels of u and 01 there is a unique level of 8, 
which we denote by U-l@, CX), which is defined by u = U(0, a). For 
any CII, the distributions of u and of 0 are now related by 
E(U(B, a), a, r) = I;(& r) (10) 
or equivalently 
P(u, a, r) = F(U-yu, a), r) (11) 
By a change of variable we can now restate the conditions making up the 
definition of mean utility preserving increase in risk as 
2?(y, r) = s’/ U,FT((8, r) d0 > 0 for all y (12) 
0 
P(l, r) = s’ U,F#I, r) d0 = 0 
0 
(13) 
(See Fig. 3 for an example of the relationship between F and p.) As with 
the mean preserving increase, condition (12) reflects a risk increase which 
is equivalent to the limit of a sequence of steps taking weight from the 
center of the probability distribution and shifting it to the tails. Now, 
however, expected utility, rather than the mean of the random variable 
is held constant. Thus it is natural to think of the mean utility preserving 
increase as a “compensated” adjustment of a mean preserving increase 
in risk.lO 
2.2. Consequences 
We can now turn to the analogue to Theorem 1 for this type of change 
in risk. We expect to find that the critical condition is the concavity of 
lo For arbitrary changes in the distribution of 0 one can consider dividing the total 
change in a fashion analogous to the Slutsky equation. Thus one would subtract a 
change in the distribution which had the same impact on expected utility, leaving a mean 
utility preserving change, which might have a signed impact on 01 if it represents an 
increase in risk. The subtracted change could be divided into income and substitution 
effects. This approach was taken by Diamond [2], 
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UE as a function of u rather than 8. Differentiating U,(U-l(u, 01), a) with 
respect to u we have 
THEOREM 2.11 Let LX*(~) be the 1eueE of the control variable which 
maximizes J U(8, a) dF(6, r). If . increases in r represent mean utility pre- 
serving increases in risk (i.e., satisfy (12) and (13)) then a* increases 
(decreases) with r if U, is a strictly convex (concave) fuaction of u, or 
Proof.12 By implicit differentiation of the first order condition, 
lIThe theorem is also valid for a discrete change in riskiness such that expected 
utilities at the respective optima are equal. Since expected marginal utility is decreasing 
in the control variable (U, < 0 is assumed) the proof follows from determining the 
sign of J U,(& a(rJ)dF(B, rz) in a parallel fashion to the proof given. 
I2 An alternate proof can be constructed by substituting U-Q CX) for 9 in the first 
order condition and applying the proof of Theorem I. 
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Thus the sign of dol*Jdr is the same as the sign of J U, dFT (== J U,F,, de). 
Applying integration by parts twice and noticing that 
F,(O, r) = FV(l, Y) = 5?(0, r) = p’(l) u) = 0 
we have 
This theorem represents a complete characterization in this case in the 
same sense that Theorem 1 did for mean preserving increases. 
From the two theorems, we see that a uniform sign of U,,, will sign 
the response of 01 to a mean preserving change in risk while a uniform 
sign of U,U,,, - U&J,, will sign the response of 01 to a mean utility 
preserving change in risk. In the next section we will develop a notion of 
increases in risk aversion, which will allow us to interpret Theorem 2 as 
stating that the optimal response to a mean utility preserving increase in 
risk is to adjust the control variable so as to make U show less risk aversion. 
2.3. Choice of a Distribution 
The basis of Theorem 2 is a set of sufficient conditions for signing the 
second derivative of expected utility with respect to 01 and r. Since the 
order of differentiation doesn’t matter, reversal of the role of 01 and r, 
i.e., making 01 the “shift” parameter and r the control, still results in a 
sign-determined effect of shift variable on control variable.13 Thus let us 
consider a situation where individuals select the distribution function of 
income (as when they select a career) and where the choice problem is 
parametrized by a variable which may reflect differences across people 
(such as risk aversion) or a level of some exogenous variable (such as the 
income tax rate). If distributions can be classed by riskiness (in the sense 
of the integral condition (12) or the single crossing property) and the 
shift parameter enters the utility function suitably we can sign the effect 
of the shift parameter (risk aversion or income tax rate, say) on the 
riskiness of selected careers. 
More formally we consider an individual with utility function U(0, a) 
selecting among a family of distributions, F(B, r) to maximize expected 
utility. 
mpx s U(0, LX) dF(0, r) 
I3 This interpretation was suggested by James Mirrlees. 
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The first order condition for this maximization is 
1 U(9, a) dF@, r*) = - j U,F, db’ = - 
To apply the analysis of Theorem 2, we must be able to show that Fr(@, r*> 
satisfies (12) and (13). (13) is equivalent to the first order condition (16) 
(12) may be verified in the context of any particular ~ro~~ern; for the 
examples we have considered, one can readily verify the stronger single 
crossing property. Thus we state this result as: 
COROLLARY. Let r*(a) be the level of the control variable which maxi- 
mizes j” U(e, CX) dF(0, r). If there exists a d such that 
F,(l?, r*)(e - 6) < 0 fir all 8 
then r* increases (decreases) with cx if a2(%og U&/a0 aa: is everywhere 
positive (negative). 
3. GREATER AVERSION TO 
3.1. DeJirzition 
Consider a mean utility preserving increase in risk for an individual. 
If a second individual finds his expected utility decreasing from this 
change for any mean utility preserving increase in risk for the first indi- 
vidual, it is natural to say that the second individual is more risk averse 
than the first. It is also natural to say that a more risk averse individual 
will pay more for perfect insurance against any risk. Fortunately, as 
with riskiness, the different natural definitions of increased risk aversion 
are equivalent and lend themselves to an analysis of differences in behavior 
as a result of differences in risk aversion (either across individuals or as 
a result of a parameter change for a given individual). For some of our 
purposes it is convenient to work with a differentiable family of utility 
functions, U(0, p), where p represents an ordinal index of risk aversion. 
Given this notation we shall start by considering four equivalent defini- 
tions of increased risk aversion. Numbers two through four are, in our 
notation and setting, three of the five definitions which Pratt [l I] showed 
to be equivalent. The inference of number one from the others is due to 
23. Leland [8]. 
I4 For the present, we suppress the role of the control variable 01. In some problems 
it will not appear. In others we can apply Theorem 3 for a given level of oi. 
346 DIAMOND AND STlGLITZ 
THEOREM 3. The following definitions of the family of utility functions 
U(tl, p) showing increasing risk aversion with the index p are equivalent.15 
(i) Mean utility preserving increases in risk are disliked by the more 
risk averse, i.e., for any change in a distribution of 0, F, + 0 satisfying 
and 
F(Y, r) = 1’ K@, PI C@, r> de 2 0 for all y 
0 
we have 
p(l, r) = 1’ U&4, p) F,.(B, r) de = 0 
0 
s ’ u,(e, p> Fde, r> de < 0; (17) 0 
(ii) For any risk, the risk premium for perfect insurance increases 
with risk aversion, i.e. for any F, p(p) defined by 
u ( j” 0 d-F - P(P), P) = j- W, PI dF WI 
P’(P) > 0; 
(iii) The index of risk aversion increases with p, i.e., 
-a2 log u,jae ap > 0; (19) 
(iv) For each pair (pl, p2) with p1 > p2, there exists a monotone 
concave function 4, 
# >o, 4” < 0 
such that 
wt PJ = wJY~~ P2N (20) 
Proof. (i) + (iii) Applying integration by parts to (17) (and recalling 
that F,(O, r) = F,(l, r) = F(O, r) = F(1, r) = 0) we have 
j- Up&, de = - I’ U,,E;, de = - s 9 U,F, de e = s a2~~~pue ri”(O, r) d6 (21) 
I5 We ignore complications in the statement of these conditions arising on sets of 
values of % of measure zero. 
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The negativity of a2 log U,/M ap and positivity of F imply (17). Conversely, 
since any nonnegative i; is admissible positive values for the second 
derivative would permit a positive value for (17). 
(iii) u (iv) Differentiating (20) with respect to B we have 
U6@, PI) = 6'wt pz) 
ude, pl) = 6ww, p2) + w7de, pa) 
or solving for 4”: 
= [joy (a2 log u,/ae a,) dp] u@(ep pd 
we, pa) 
The negativity of 4” follows from the integration. Conversely, a contra- 
diction of (19) over a range of p would contradict 4” < 0. 
(ii) + (iii) Calculating p(p) by implicit d~~ere~tiation of (18). 
P'(P) = (& (S 0 dF - P(p), P) - S r/6(e, p) dF1 (2% 
UC? 
Define 
0 for 0 < e < 
s 
ledF---p 
I;(e, r*) = 0 
1 for s 
ledF--y<e<l 
a 
F(f?, P*> is the (improper) distribution of the safe prospect which yields 
the same (expected) utility as the risky distribution F(F(B, r); henc@ from 
the definition of F(F(B, r*) 
i7’(e, r) = je U,(F(e, r) - F(e; r*)) de > 0 ~OS 0 G e < I (24 
0 
and 
s l U,(F(e, r> - F(e, r*)) dB = 0 0 
I6 We defined T(O, r) above (Eq. (8)) for differential cha.nges in Y. The change from 
F(0, I) to F(6, r*) is not a “small change.” Since the RHS of (24) and (25) are perfectly 
analogous to the RHS of (8) and (9), we shall use the same symbol p. 
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We can now calculate 
= - s U,,[F(O, r*) - F(C?, r)] d0 
=- s $ U,[F(O, r*) - F(0, r)] d0 e 
zzz s a2 log ue p(0, r) de a0 ap (26) 
The equivalence follows from (26) since 5? is nonnegative and any distribu- 
tion F is admissible. 1 
It is interesting to note that (iii) permits us to conclude that with 
suitable normalization to keep the mean of log LJ, constant the more 
risk averse individual has a riskier distribution of log U, , since the 
monotonicity of a log U,jatl in p implies the single crossing property. 
This result fits with the observation that someone who is risk neutral has 
a constant marginal utility, implying that a risk averse person (or a risk 
lover) has greater variation in his marginal utility. 
If we think of people choosing careers as choosing a distribution of 
possible incomes and if the income streams for different careers have the 
single crossing property, the definition of risk aversion permits us to 
interpret the corollary to Theorem 2 as saying that more risk averse 
people choose less risky careers. This result is interesting only as a con- 
firmation of the matching of the definitions of risk and risk aversion. 
The formulation of the definitions of risk aversion are structured to 
cover the familiar single argument utility function, or the appearance of 
a single random variable in a many argument utility function. For example 
the two period consumption model with known wages falls within this 
formulation, since the only random variable is the rate of return. In 
making comparisons between utility functions of several arguments, one 
approach is to examine individuals who differ only in their degree of risk 
aversion, that is, to assume that the two individuals being compared have 
the same indifference curves between random and control variables 
denoted by 0 and a: respectively. (These may be vectors rather than scalars 
as in this analysis.) Thus we have increased risk aversion if there is a 
monotone concave function + so that 
uw, 4 = #w2(~, 4) (27) 
Considering a family of utility functions indexed by p, the requirement 
RISK AND RISK AVERSION 349 
of identical indifference curves implies that we can write the family of 
functions F’(O, CS, p) in the separable form V(U(0, CX), p). The concavitgi 
condition gives us a derivative property (analogous to (19)). 
a2 log v,jau ap < 0 
for risk aversion to increase with p.17 
3.2. Consequences 
The analysis above, which showed the close re~atio~sh~~ between 
increased risk and increased risk aversion, suggests the possibility sf an 
analogue to Theorem 2 relating changes in the control variable to increased 
risk aversion rather than increased riskiness. 
THEOREM 4. Let u*(p) be the level of the control variable which maxi- 
mizes j” V(U(B, a), p) dF(B). If . increases in p represent increases in risk 
aversion (i.e., satisfy (19)), then CL* increases (decreases) with p if there 
exists a I!?* such that U, a(<) Ofor 6’ < 8* and U, <(a) 0 for 9 3 8*. 
Sroooji The first order condition for optimal&y is 
I V&J, dF = 0 
y implicit differentiation we have 
Concavity of V in a! implies that the sign of dm*/dp is the same as that sf 
$ V,,U, dF. Multiplying and dividing by Vu and adding a constant times 
the first order condition, we have 
vuL@v, 4 PI 
v”JcT dF = s t v&ye, a), p) - 
The integrand is everywhere positive (negative) since bo%h terms change 
sign just once a% 8*. 1 
The mathematical parallel between Theorems 2 and 4 is most clearly 
brought out by considering the former for an increase in risk which has 
I7 Given our assumption that 170 is positive, this does not represent a change in 
conditions since 3 log V~jatQp = U&P log Vu/aU+. Thus (28) is equivalent to 
I V,,F& dB < 0 and p’(p) > 0 where V(U(s BdF - p, a), p) = J” Y(U(B, a), p) dF. 
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the single crossing property. Plotting the two terms to be multiplied in 
the integrand to sign the numerator we have 
FIGURE 4 
The result follows from the monotonicity of (U,,/ U,>, resp. (V,/ VU) and 
the fact that U,F, resp. (V,U,F,) integrates to zero with a single sign 
change.ls 
Pursuing the parallel between the proofs, we could integrate the 
numerator in (29) by parts before seeking a sufficient condition to sign 
the expression: 
1 V,U, dF = 1 (V,/V,) V,U, dF = - 1 (a2 In V&p a6) f+(ti, r) dh’ 
(31) 
where T(k), r) = Ji VJJ, dF and using a normalization of V to preserve 
expected marginal utility in a similar fashion to the analysis in the 
previous section. We could now replace the single crossing property in 
Theorem 4 by the nonnegativity of T. However, if the single crossing 
property is not satisfied by the utility function the integral condition 
depends on the distribution of ~9 as well as the properties of V (and can 
be reversed in sign for some distribution of 0). In addition we have not 
found applications for this more general assumption.lg 
The single crossing property of U, as a function of 0 may be satisfied 
from a variety of alternative assumptions on the structure of the choice 
problem. One way of ensuring a single crossing is to have U,, uniformly 
signed at U, = 0. Given continuity, two crossings would necessarily 
have opposite slopes. If we consider the certainty problem where 6 is 
a parameter, then the sign of U,, when U, = 0 is the same as the sign of 
I8 This proof points up the fact that the corollary to Theorem 2 is also derivable as a 
corollary to Theorem 4, letting utility, U, be the random variable, which implies that 
the control variable, 01, affects the distribution of the random variable. 
I9 This is the same situation as with the corollary to Theorem 2. 
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the derivative of the optimal level of the control variable with respect to 
the parameter Se20 
COROLLARY. Let a(@) be the level of the control variable which maxi- 
mizes U(E, 0). Let a*(p) be the level of the control variable which satirizes 
j- .u%% a PI dfvo. If increases in p represent increases in risk ~vers~5~ 
(i.e., satisfy (19)), then 01* increases (decreases) with p $ B decreases 
(increases) with 8. 
The corollary can be connected with the notion of a risk ~rerni~rn- 
Theorem 3 established that more risk averse individuals have larger risk 
premiums. If we describe any action under uncertainty as if it were made 
under certainty with risk premiums deducted from the expected return, 
then we would expect increased risk aversion to have the same effect as a 
decreased rate of return in the certainty problem. This is precisely the 
result in the above corollary. For example, if, under certainty, savings 
decrease with the interest rate, then with a single risky asset, savings 
increase with risk aversion.21 
4. MEASURES OF RISK AVERSION 
Three measures of risk aversion have received attention in the literature. 
We shall relate these to Theorem 3 by examining the circumstances under 
which a variable can serve as an index of risk aversion as defined in that 
theorem. For different problems this will coincide with assumptions about 
these measures of risk aversion. Following Menezes and Hanson [9], 
we shall call them measures of absolute (A), relative (R) and partial ( 
risk aversiorP and define them for a utility function B(X) as 
A(x) = --B”(x)/B’(x) 
R(x) = -xB”(x)/B’(x) (32) 
P(x, y) = -xBYx + Y)lB’CX + Y> 
20 We are indebted to R. Khilstrom and L. Mirman for pointing out a deficiency in 
our earlier proof. 
21 The optimal savings problem is the maximization of the expectation of the 
two-period utility function B(C, (W - C)(l + i)) where w is initial wealth, C current 
consumption and i the (random) interest rate. 
ae A and R were introduced by Arrow [l] and Pratt [II]. P was introduced by C. 
Menezes and D. Hanson [9] whose approach and notation we follow and whose results 
we relate to our approach, and by R. Zeckhauser and E. Keeler ]17]. 
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They are related by the equation 
m, u) = Nx + Y> - Pm + Y> (33) 
The key ingredient in the analysis23 is whether the measures increase or 
decrease in X. Differentiating the definitions we have 
A’(x) = -(B’(x))-2 (B’(x) B”(x) - (B”(x))2) 
R’(x) = --B”(x)/B’(x) - w@(x))-2 (B’(x) B”(x) - (B”(x))2) 
P,(x, y) = --B”(x + y>/lqx + v> - x@‘(x + v>>-” (34) 
x (B’(x + u) B”(x + v> - (Wx + v>)“> 
with the obvious relationship 
p&G u) = R’(x + v> - YA’(X + VI (35) 
Since the assumption of an increasing, concave utility function has no 
sign implications on the third derivative of the utility functions over a 
finite range, it is clear that absolute risk aversion may increase or decrease. 
The same is true for the other indices only if x does not assume the value 
zero. This is not a restriction for relative risk aversion, since most problems 
are set up to exclude zero consumption. It does represent a restriction on 
partial risk aversion since the first order condition for many problems 
will require x to take on both positive and negative values. 
To relate the three measures of risk aversion to the analysis of Section 3, 
we must consider some specific problem and select some variable of the 
problem to serve as an index of risk aversion. For differently structured 
problems the sign conditions on the index of risk aversion (a210g U,laO ap) 
will be equivalent to an increasing or decreasing measure of risk aversion 
for one of the three measures. To relate the three expressions in (34) 
to our index we can ask what interaction between 0 and p will yield a one 
signed derivative in (34) for a one signed index of risk aversion. By straight- 
forward calculation one can check the three formulations 
I 
wt P) = m + f) 
we, d = w+) 
1 
(36) 
w4 d = B(Y + ed 
Thus we can conclude that absolute risk aversion increases when leftward 
translation of the axis corresponds to a concave transform of the utility 
23 The measures indicate aversion to small risks at a given point. To evaluate responses 
to a large risk, we need assumptions on the measures throughout the relevant range of 
income. 
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function. Similarly relative risk aversion increases when multiplicative 
stretching of the axis (about the origin) corresponds to a concave trans- 
form. Increasing partial risk aversion corresponds to a concave transform 
for a multiplicative transform of the axis beyond the value y. 
To illustrate the role of the measures of risk aversion, let us examine 
Theorem 3 which showed that an increasing index of risk aversion was 
equivalent to an increased risk premium. The definition of the risk 
premium was 
We shall examine the relationship of the risk premium to initial wealt 
and the size of the gamble, 2. For this purpose we define the risk ~rern~~rn 
alternatively as 
j U(w + z) dF(z) = U (w + j” z dF(z) - ~(MJ: z,) 
or 
- T(W, z) = U-1 ( j” U(w + z) dF(z)) - .c z dF - w (381 
To take advantage of the special forms of the family of utility functions, 
we can allow the index to affect just wealth, or wealth and the size of the 
gamble, or just the size of the gamble. 
For these formulations (Eq. 36) respectively we make the three substitu- 
tions 
z for 0, pw for p 
w  + z for 0 I 
z for 6, w  for y ? 
(3% 
Substituting in the definition of the risk premium (37) for the three 
formulations we have 
j= B(z + pw) dF(z) = B (/ z dF(z) - p(p) t wp) 
j” B((w + z) p) dF(z) = B ((w + j- z dFCz) - P(P)) P 
B(w + pz> S(z) = B fw + (j 2 dK4 - P(P)) P 
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Solving these three equations for p(p) we have 
I 
-p(p) = B-l ( j B(z + pw) dF) - j z dF - W,J 
-pp(p) = B-l (j B((w + z) p) dF) - j pz dF - wp 
: 
(41) 
-pp(p) = B-l ( j B(w + pz) dF) - j pz dF - w 
Comparing (41) and (38) we can relate the risk premium as a function of 
wealth and gamble size to its definition in terms of the risk index 
Thus, by Theorem 3 we have shown that 
&i-(pw,z)/ap 2 0 as A’(x) >( 0 
Mfw, PZ>/~>/~P 2 0 as R’(x) 2 0 (43) 
a(4w, PYPPP 2.0 as P,(x, w) 2 0 
With these definitions we can examine further the two examples con- 
sidered above. Where career choice gives a ranking of the implied income 
distributions by riskiness, an increase in the rate of a proportional income 
tax increases (decreases) the riskiness of the chosen careers if relative risk 
aversion is increasing (decreasing). 24 Considering the special case of 
savings with a single risky asset where the utility function is additive,25 
B,(C) + B,( FV - C)(l + i)), a mean utility preserving increase in risk 
increases (decreases) savings as relative risk aversion in period 2, 
xBi(x)/B2’(x), is decreasing (increasing) with consumption.26 
24 Choice of a career, Y, is made to maximize s B((1 - t)QfF(e, r) where t is the tax 
rate and 0, before tax income. Identifying f with a in the corollary to Theorem 2 gives 
the result. This result appears in M. S. Feldstein [4]. 
25 The result only requires that attitudes toward risk in each period be independent 
of the level of consumption in the other period. This situation has been described by 
R. Keeney [6] and R. Pollack [lo] and requires a utility function of the form B(x,, xZ) = 
ccl + bCl(X,) + b2Gcd + ~,GWG(x2). 
26 The simplicity of this result should be contrasted with consideration of the mean 
preserving increase in risk in this problem. See Rothschild and Stiglitz [13]. 
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5. PORTFOLIO CHOICE 
The problem which has received the most attention in this general 
area is the division of a given initial wealth between safe and risky assets. 
Denoting initial wealth, security holdings, and the rate of return on the 
safe and risky assets by w, s, m and i, we can write utility as 
B(w(l + m) + s(i - m)) 
The most obvious application of the results above comes from considering 
a family of utihty functions showing increased risk aversion. Then, by 
Theorem 4.27 
EXAMPLE: 1. Of two individuals with the same wealth, the more risk 
averse has a lower absolute value of security holding. 
The focus of much of the attention in this area has been on the imphca-. 
tions of changing initial wealth for security holdings. We can obtain 
the well-known relationships of the derivatives of security holding to 
wealth as corollaries to Example 1 by identifying w  with the index of risk 
aversion. 
To match the notation of this section with that of Theorem 4, let us 
pair (w(l + m), S, (i - m)) with (p, a, 0) and set ii/(+ 6) equal to ST, the 
(random) return on security holdings; thus writing V(U, p) as 
B(w(l -+ m) + U). Then - VUU/VU equals the index of absolute risk 
aversion. We have then 
COROLLARY 1. The absolute value of security holdings increases 
(decreases) with wealth if absolute risk aversion decreases (increases) with 
wealth. 
ne aspect of the approach we have taken is that the index of relative 
aversion also arises from the concavity property upon exarn~n~~ 
the fraction of wealth held in risky securities, which we denote by 8. We 
now write utihty as 
B(w(1 + m + E(i - m))) 
If we identify (w, 3, i - m) with (p, a, 6) and set U(B, 8) equal to 
1 + m + E(i - m) the gross rate of return on total wealth, then V(U, p) 
27 Clearly M/as = (i - m)B’ = U, changes sign only once. @B/2) = sB’ = Ua 
is signed by the sign of s. Since a negative value of Ue reverses the sign of the effect of 
p on 01* in Theorem 3, we find that s decreases or increases as it is positive or negative. 
Thus the absolute level of security holdings, j s j, decreases. 
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becomes B(wU). The concavity condition, -a2 In VU/au ap, is equal to 
the derivative of the index of relative risk aversion. Thus we have 
COROLLARY 2. The absolute value of the fraction of security holdings 
increases (decreases) with wealth ifrelative risk aversion decreases (increases) 
with wealth. 
We have now considered three applications of Theorem 4 relating 
choice to risk aversion. Now let us turn to the effects of change in the 
distribution of the random variable. 
EXAMPLE 2.28 A mean utility preserving increase in risk decreases the 
absolute value of security holdings if P,(&, w(1 + M)) > 0. 
Identifying (s, i - m) with (01, e), it is straightforward to check that P, 
and condition (15) of Theorem 2 have opposite signs. From the relations 
among risk aversion indices, one can see that a sufficient condition for 
P, to be positive is that absolute risk aversion be decreasing and relative 
risk aversion increasing. Thus we have 
COROLLARY 3. If the consumer has decreasing absolute risk aversion 
and increasing relative risk aversion, then the absolute value of security 
holdings decreases with a mean utility preserving increase in risk. 
6. TAXATION AND PORTFOLIO CHOICE 
One change in the distribution of returns which is easily parametrized 
is that induced by tax change. Tax structures vary in their loss offset 
provisions and in the tax rates on the returns to different assets (e.g. 
capital gains as opposed to interest income); we consider the effects of 
changes in each of these. We assume that holdings of each asset and the 
safe rate of return are nonnegative (m > 0, s 3 0, w - s 2 0). We begin 
with the cases of full and no loss offsets, before turning to more com- 
plicated partial oKsets. To explore tax rate changes, we shall write utility 
as a function of the tax rate with a given distribution of before tax returns 
and examine demand changes by exploring taxes as indices of risk aver- 
sion. To compare tax structures we shall compare the distributions of 
after tax rates of return. 
We denote the tax rates on the two incomes by ti and t, . With full 
loss offset we can write utility of after tax terminal wealth as 
B(w + si(1 - tJ + (w - s) m(1 - t,)) (44) 
28 Since (i - m) must change sign to satisfy the first order condition, P, negative 
through the relevant values of # is not possible. 
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With no loss offset, we would write utility as 
B(w + s Min(i(1 - ti), i) + (w - s) m(1 - tm)) (43 
It is straightforward to check that the partial risk aversion measure 
indicates whether ti is an index of risk aversion. Thus we have 
EXAMPLE 3.2s With full loss offset, risky security holdings increase 
with the tax rate on the return to the risky asset if partial risk aversion 
is increasing, for all i in the relevant range, i.e. if P&C, y) > 0 with 
x = si(l - ti) and y = w  + (w - s) m(1 - t,). he same ~ro~osi~io~~ 
holds with no loss offset under the slightly weaker condition that B, is 
ositive throughout the relevant range of positive rates of return: i. 
To compare the different offset rules, let us denote the after tax return 
by i’ and write utility as 
B(w + si’ + (w - s) m(l - t,)) 
If the distribution of the before tax return is F(i), with full loss offset the 
distribution of after tax return satisfies 
G(i’, tf) = F(F(i’/(l - ri)) 
With no loss offset the distribution of after tax return satisfies 
H(i’, P) = F(C) i’ < 0 
= F(i’/(l - P”)) i’ > 0 
(47) 
where we distinguish tax rates in the two cases by tf and tn. If the two 
tax structures are to yield the same expected utility tf must exceed tn. Thus 
this change in tax structure and rates satisfies the single crossing property, 
with the loss offset giving the less risky distribution; hence using the 
result of Example 2, we obtain 
EXAMPLE 4. If partial risk aversion is increasing a tax on the risky 
asset with full loss offset results in a higher level of security holdings 
than an equal expected utility tax with no loss offset (but a lower tax rate). 
In addition, expected tax revenue is higher with. a full loss offset in this 
case. 
29 This example shows clearly the limitation on the possibility of a negative P, . 
With m = 0 and full loss offset it is clear from the utility function that s*(3 - h,) is 
constant independent of the shape of B. Thus the reversed conclusion of the example 
would never occur for this case. 
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To prove the second part of the example, it is sufficient to show that 
expected government revenue per unit invested is higher with full loss 
offset and these tax rates. If the tax rates were adjusted to keep expected 
revenue per unit of investment (and thus the expectation of i’) constant, 
the change would be mean preserving rather than mean utility preserving. 
Thus expected utility would be lower with the riskier distribution, the 
case with no loss offset. To equate expected utilities, the tax rate without 
loss offset must be lowered, reducing expected revenue per unit invested. 
To consider limited loss offsets, let us assume that both income sources 
are taxed at the same rate and losses on the risky asset may be offset 
against returns on the safe asset. In addition we shall allow partial off- 
setting of any remaining losses against initial wealth (or equivalently 
safe non-investment income). Let us denote by Y the level of before tax 
income 
Y = si + (w - s)m (48) 
The distribution of Y depends on the distribution of i and the choice of s 
G(Y, s) = F((Y - (w - s)m)/s) (49) 
Let us note that 
G, = ((wm - Y)/s2)F’ (50) 
so that the distribution satisfies the single crossing property. Let us assume 
that some fraction of remaining losses, f, 0 < f < 1, can be set off against 
initial wealth. Then, we can write utility as 
B(w, + Min(Y(l - t), Y(l - ft))) (51) 
We can now examine the response to changes in f and t. By the corollary 
to Theorem 2 we have 
EXAMPLE 5. With partial loss offset, if tax rates and offset fraction 
are adjusted to keep equal expected utility, risky security holdings increase 
with the tax rate and the offset fraction if partial risk aversion is increasing. 
Since the tax rate and offset fraction must both increase to keep expected 
utility constant, it is clear that risky security holdings are larger with 
complete loss offset than with an equal expected utility partial loss offset, 
provided that P, is positive. 
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7. COSTS OF MEETING RANDQM DEMAND 
Consider a firm with a concave production function F(K9 L) (with 
positive marginal products) which selects K ex ante and L ex post to 
meet a random demand Q in order to maximize the expectation of utility 
of costs f B(rK + wL) S(Q). We can prove the propositionS 
EXAIVIPLE 6. If capital and labor are complements (FKL > O), the 
more risk averse the firm the greater its level of capital. 
Define L(Q, K) implicitly by Q = F(K, L). Then, identifying (01, 8) 
with (K> Q) we can check the condition of Theorem that U,- 
B’[Y + w(aL/aK)] has a unique value of Q for which it equals zero. 
follows from the monotonicity of aL/aK in Q, given FKL > 0. 
aL FK as5 -= -- 
aK FL' 
- = FLLF;uFL3 - S;;KFL” < 
aK aQ (521 
To examine the effect of an increase in risk let us consider the special 
case of an expected cost minimizer with a constant returns to scale, 
constant elasticity-of-substitution production function 
EXAMPLE 7. A mean utility (i.e., cost) preserving increase in risk 
increases (decreases) the level of capital if the elasticity of substitution is 
greater (less) than one. 
Again the calculations are straightforward, but tedious. Eet 
F(1, L/K) = f(1). The elasticity of substitution G, is given by 
G = -f ‘(f - lf’)/ff”i 
Let a = (f - f ‘Q/f ‘I; then, making the obvious identi~~ations 
U, = w(dL/dQ) = wFL’ = wf ‘-’ 
Urn, = wf ‘Ifii-If’-” = awo-lK-lf ‘-1 
U,, = -wf”K-‘f’-” 
w d(a/a) - u,,, = y (f ‘y’-3K-2) - Kf’ dQ 
Thus we have 
utP&3, - 
w2 d(u/u) w2 d(a/cr) 1 
w&Y=Kf’2-q-=Kf’$-yjj- Kj’ i i (533 
With u constant a decreases (increases) with I when cr is greater (less) 
than one. 
30 If there are constant returns to scale, FKc is always positive. 
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